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Is Pakistan on the Verge of Collapse?
By Krista Woodard
What would happen if Islamic extremist groups such as the Taliban gained control of an arsenal of nuclear missiles? Can we really afford to find out the answer to that question?
Historically, power in the nation of Pakistan has mostly been assigned to the role of Prime Minister. However, in 1999 Pervez Musharraf took over by use of a military coup. He made many changes, among them reassignment in the constitution of much of the power to the President, the role he now filled.
In 2007, the U.S. government was hopeful that Benazir Bhutto, two-time prime minister of Pakistan, would restore democracy to the nation. Bhutto had been charged with corruption and took exile in Dubai. She made a deal with Musharraf that her party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), would abstain from the vote in the presidential election and in return she would receive amnesty. She returned from exile late in 2007 in order to participate in the 2008 general elections but was tragically assassinated in December 2007. An Al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan claimed responsibility for the assassination, stating that he did so because she “vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen.” 1 While her son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, was to succeed her as the leader of the PPP, her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, is filling the role as co-leader until Bilawal has completed his education.
Musharraf exercised some of his executive powers to secure his role as President. When he received the vote in October 2007, it was contested due to the fact that he also filled the role of Chief of the Army. He resigned that position, suspended the constitution, later declared a state of emergency, and went so far as to place judges and members of both opposition parties under house arrest. His tactics worked; in November 2007 he was administered an oath for another five-year term as President.
The two opposing parties, PPP led by Zardari and The Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif, formed a coalition in an attempt to gain control of the government. They were instrumental in bringing impeachment proceedings against Musharraf, and he resigned in August of 2008. An indirect presidential election was held in September and Zardari became president. Almost immediately he forgot his campaign promises to amend the constitution, thereby ridding it of all those extraordinary executive powers created by Musharraf. Within six monnths, “The PPP... used the Supreme Court to dislodge the PML-N government headed by Nawaz Sharif’s brother.” 2 Needless to say, the coalition dissolved.
In addition to the political unrest, Pakistan continues to have difficulty with Islamic militant groups such as Taliban, especially along its border with Afghanistan. In the past several years there have been “over 60 suicide-bombings... on hotels, restaurants and mosques in Peshawar, Lahore and Islamabad, and on army facilities. Benazir Bhutto... was one high-profile victim...In Peshawar...two Afghan diplomats and one Iranian have been kidnapped. America’s consul last year had her (bulletproof) car sprayed with bullets.” 3 In fact, one of the biggest reasons that Pakistan has such trouble with the extremist groups is that they have supported them in the past for their own gain, usually to help against outside enemies.
In February 2009 President Zardari chose to appease the Taliban by offering a cease-fire agreement regarding the SWAT Valley, even though Pakistan has 160 million people and an army of 550,000 active duty personnel 4, making it larger than the American Army which has only 549,153 5. The agreement was that the Taliban could institute the strict Sharia law in that area but had to agree to lay down their weapons.
Apparently nobody has explained to Mr. Zardari that dealing with terrorists never works. A week after the agreement was reached, the very religious leader who negotiated the accord, Sufi Mohammad, was supposed to instruct the Taliban to disarm. Instead he “denounced Pakistan’s constitution and said democracy was for infidels.” 6
Emboldened by having the SWAT Valley handed to them, the Taliban moved on to overtake the neighboring district of Buner in April. This placed them a mere 65 miles from Islamabad - 65 miles from nuclear capability. This caused an uproar in the international community. David Kilcullen, an advisor on terrorism to both the Bush and now the Obama administrations, expressed great concern: “We have to face the fact that if Pakistan collapses it will dwarf anything we have seen so far in whatever we’re calling the war on terror now.” 7
The Pakistan army has responded to the global outcry by fighting the insurgents, but history reveals that it may be mostly for show. “One of the tricks used by the former president, Pervez Musharraf, was to arrest a few of the former jihadist assets of the army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency; then later release them.” 8
If only money could solve the problem. Since 2001, the U.S. has given more than $10 billion in military aid to Pakistan, and the country has only become more turbulent and violent. It’s clear that there needs to be more accountability for the additional $1.5 billion we will be providing in the next ten years. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced recently the decision to send an additional $110 million to help the 1.5 million Pakistanis displaced as a result of the military action.
In the midst of all this political instability and the threat to not only Pakistan, but potentially the whole world if Islamabad is taken by extremists, many global watchdogs have expressed certainty that Pakistan’s end is inevitable. The question now is how to best handle the situation to ensure global security.
Footnotes:
1. http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/27/bhutto.dhs.alqaeda/index.html
2. http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/mar/10guest-is-india-ready-for-pakistans-coming-collapse.htm
3. “A Real Offensive, or a Phoney War?”, Economist; 5/2/2009, Vol. 390 Issue 8529, p24-26
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Pakistan
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_United_States
6. “A Real Offensive, or a Phoney War?”, Economist; 5/2/2009, Vol. 390 Issue 8529, p24-26
7. http://www.smh.com.au/world/warning-that-pakistan-is-in-danger-of-collapse-within-months-20090412-a40u.html
8. “A Real Offensive, or a Phoney War?”, Economist; 5/2/2009, Vol. 390 Issue 8529, p24-26
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